A category C consists of the following three mathematical entities: A class ob Cwhose elements are called objects; A class hom Cwhose elements are called morphisms or maps or arrows. Each morphism f has a source object a and target object b. The expression hom a, b — alternatively expressed as homC a, bmor a, bor C a, b — denotes the hom-class of all morphisms from a to b.
References and Further Reading 1. Exemplar models were also being developed during this time, but the prototype theory encapsulated many of the views which were the foils against which the Theory-Theory developed its main assumptions. These theories assume that concepts represent statistical information about the categories that they pick out.
The concept tree represents the properties that people take to be typical of trees: These comprise the tree prototype or stereotype. This stereotype is acquired by a process of abstraction from examples: This summary is often represented as a list of features that belong to category members.
Properties that are more frequently perceived in the instances will be assigned a greater feature weight in the prototype. This process of concept acquisition is often portrayed as a passive one.
Similarity computations also explain other phenomena, such as the fact that some objects are better examples of a category than others flamingos and penguins are atypical birds since they lack most of the prototypical bird features.
The prototype theory has several characteristics which made it a fitting target for Theory theorists. First, it suggests that concepts have a basically superficial nature. Often, though not invariably, features in prototypes were assumed to be readily perceivable.
Prototype theory was thus affiliated with a certain empiricist bent. This was reinforced by the fact that prototypes are acquired by a simple statistical-associative process akin to that assumed by classical empiricists. Second, prototype theory involved a relatively impoverished account of conceptual development and deployment.
Concepts passively adjust themselves to new stimuli, and these stimuli activate stored concepts in virtue of their resemblances, but there is little role for active revision or reflective deployment of these concepts. In the wake of the anti-empiricist backlash that gave rise to contemporary cognitive science, particularly in cognitive-developmental psychology, these assumptions were ripe for questioning.
Origins of the View The Theory-Theory itself has a somewhat complicated origin story, with roots in a number of philosophical and psychological doctrines. One is the reaction against stage theories of cognitive development, particularly Piagetian and Vygotskian theories.
Each stage is characterized by a distinctive set of representations and processes. Similarly, Vygotsky held that children move from a stage of representing categories in terms of sensory images of individual objects, through a stage of creating representations of objectively unified categories, and finally a stage of categories arranged around abstract, logical relationships.
Early childhood cognition, in short, involves being perceptually bound. While the empirical basis and explanatory structure of these theories had been challenged before see R. A paradigm shift occurs when counterevidence to a theory has built up beyond a certain threshold and it can no longer be adequately modified in response, consistent with its not becoming intolerably ad hoc.
In paradigm shifts, new explanatory notions and models take center stage, and old ones may be pushed to the margins or adopt new roles. New practices and styles of experimentation become central.
These changes are relatively discontinuous compared with the usual gradual accumulation of changes and modifications characteristic of science.
A second, connected with this notion of a paradigm shift, is the Kuhnian doctrine of incommensurability. This is the idea that when new theories are constructed, the central explanatory concepts of the old theory often change their meaning, so that a claim made before and after a paradigm shift, even if it uses the same words, may not express the same proposition, since those words now express different concepts.
Often this involves creating new concepts that cannot be captured in the conceptual vocabulary of the old theory, differentiating two concepts that were previously conflated, or coalescing two previously distinct concepts into one. In all of these cases, the expressive vocabulary of the new conceptual scheme is not equivalent to that of the old scheme.
Theory theorists have often adopted both the Kuhnian claim about paradigm shifts as a model for understanding certain phenomena in development, and the associated claim of semantic or conceptual incommensurability Carey, This view is most clearly defended by Quinewho proposes that children begin life with an innate similarity space that is governed by perceptual information, and over time begin to develop theoretical structures that supersede these initial groupings.
Inductive inferences concerning a category are within reach so long as they are confined to these observable properties, and objects share inductive potential to the extent that they are similar to the perceptual prototype. Moreover, these perceptual prototypes are assumed to be acquired by statistical tabulation of observed co-occurrences in the world, in a relatively theory-free way; seeing that certain furry quadrupeds meow is sufficient for constructing a cat concept that encodes these properties.
It is only at later stages of development that concepts reflect understanding of the hidden structure of categories, and come to enable inductions that go beyond such similarities.
On the other hand, the category of things on the left side of my desk, or things within feet of the Eiffel Tower, or things that are either electrons or clown wigs, do not.
They are simply arbitrary collections. Feature-based theories of concepts, such as prototype theory, seem to have particular difficulty explaining the phenomenon of coherence, since they are inherently unconstrained and allow any set of properties to be lumped together to form a category, whereas our concepts often appear to represent categories as involving more than merely sets of ad hoc co-instantiated properties.
They include relations among these properties, as well as explanatory connections of various sorts.
These features are explanatorily connected in various ways: Insofar as these explanatory relations among properties are represented, concepts themselves are more coherent, reflecting our implicit belief in the worldly coherence of their categories.
Theories are the conceptual glue that makes many of our everyday and scientific concepts coherent, and models of concepts that fail to accord theories an important role are missing an account of a crucial phenomenon however, see Margolis, for detailed criticism of this notion.
From this survey, it should be clear that the development of Theory theories of concepts has been driven by a host of different motivations and pressures.The Cognitive Learning Theory explains why the brain is the most incredible network of information processing and interpretation in the body as we learn things.
This theory can be divided into two specific theories: the Social Cognitive Theory (SCT), and the Cognitive Behavioral Theory (CBT). 57) rings significantly through Bronfenbrenner’s Ecological Systems Theory (Bronfenbrenner and Evans ); a theory which focuses on gaining insight into human development through identifying the circumstances and considering the environmental influences of which a child is raised not just the genetic components.
Categories disassemble a concept into a set of featural components, and all the features are then necessary (and sufficient) to define the category. Each feature is an essential element of the category. The levels of processing effect was the creation of Robert S.
Lockhart and Fergus I.
M. Craik in The duo introduced this model as an alternative to prior memory theories (Atkinson & Shiffrin) which had divided memory into sensory, working and long-term stages.
We can process information in 3 ways: Shallow Processing - This takes two forms. torosgazete.comural processing (appearance) which is when we encode only the physical qualities of something. E.g. the typeface of a word or how the letters torosgazete.com: Saul Mcleod. Information processing is the change (processing) of information in any manner detectable by an observer.
As such, it is a process that describes everything that happens (changes) in the universe, from the falling of a rock (a change in position) to the printing of a text file from a digital computer system.